Supreme Court

Supreme Court to hear FAAAA Preemption Challenge in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

John C. Lane

We reported on this Seventh Circuit case in April 2025. The Seventh Circuit, which has been a friendly venue for transportation brokers, held that a transportation broker is shielded by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) from liability for negligent selection of a motor carrier. Now the Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal and to address a conflict among the Circuit Courts on the issue of federal preemption of a claim against brokers and motor carriers. The Supreme Court has granted Montgomery’s petition for certiorari, in which The Question Presented is simply stated:

Does § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?

That section provides protection to motor carriers and freight brokers and freight forwarders, and is the backbone of the “FAAAA Preemption” argument:

. . . a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation or other provision having the force and effect of a law related to price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property [emphasis added].

In Montgomery, a plaintiff severely injured in a trucking accident brought a negligence claim against the broker, arguing that it should be held liable because it was negligent in selecting the motor carrier, and that it was vicariously liable for the trucker’s negligence because it so controlled the trucker that the carrier became the broker’s agent. The Court of Appeals ruled for the broker on both theories. It specifically held that the minimal requirements the broker placed on the motor carrier did not arise to operational control. Relevant to the impending Supreme Court review, however, the Seventh Circuit held that the broker is protected by the language in the FAAAA, at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), quoted above.

The Seventh Circuit held that the negligent hiring claim has a direct relationship to the broker’s services in hiring the motor carrier. Thus, it is expressly preempted by Section 14501(c)(1).

In a similar case in the Sixth Circuit, Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, favorable to the broker, and held that preemption was unavailable to the broker because of the “safety exception” found in Section 14502(c)(2)(A). That section holds that the preemption of Section 14501(c)(1):

shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.

Although the “safety exception” makes no mention of brokers, the Sixth Circuit in Cox held that the work of transportation brokers is sufficiently related to motor carriers’ work to bring the broker’s work within the exception. The case involved a wrongful death tort action brought by Robert Cox, as Administrator of the estate of his wife, Greta Cox.

Following Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit held that “State regulatory authority” includes a State’s power to create common-law duties that involve safety. It held that the Cox Estate’s common-law claims “are part of the regulatory authority of a State,” satisfying the first prong of Section 14501(c)(2)(A). The second prong, whether the state law must be “with respect to motor vehicles,” is the “vigorously disputed” issue and the source of the split among the circuits. The Court ruled that the statutory definitions of “motor vehicle” “make it clear that such motor vehicles are the core to the services provided by brokers” even if that relation is not direct. Unlike the decisions in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, the Sixth Circuit in Cox concludes succinctly:

We therefore hold that, where a negligent hiring claim against a broker substantively concerns motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety, that claim is within “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.”

Total Quality Logistics’ petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari has been fully briefed and awaits a decision whether the Court will take up that case. The Question Presented there is different from that in Montgomery and raises the application of the so-called “safety exception”:

Whether a common-law negligence claim alleged against a freight broker, based on the broker’s selection of a motor carrier to provide transportation of cargo, is preempted because it does not fall within the safety exception to Section 14502(c)(2)(A).

If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Total Quality Logistics and consolidates the two appeals, it will have the opportunity to clarify the long-debated issue of FAAAA preemption for transportation brokers.

Supreme Court to Handle Another Arbitration Dispute: Are Bakery-Product Delivery Drivers Transportation Workers or Bakery Workers?

John C. Lane

And why does it matter? Because if they are transportation workers, their putative class action under the FLSA must proceed in court, not by contracted-for arbitration. But if they are bakery workers, they must submit to arbitration. The Second Circuit held they are not transportation workers and therefore must submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the workers’ further appeal, in Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC.

Certainly Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act forbids a transportation worker, even an independent contractor, to be compelled to arbitrate a claim against an employer. That was settled by the Court in its 2019 decision in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira. The unusual setting in Bissonnette raises the issue for the Court of whether the workers are transportation workers or, perhaps, bakery workers.

The workers entered into distributor agreements with defendant bakery companies. In a putative class action, they alleged they were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees, in violation of the FLSA and Connecticut law, seeking reclassification and damages. The bakery defendants moved to compel arbitration under a contractual provision that also excluded class or other representative actions. But what was their job?

Under the agreements, plaintiffs purchased their own service territories, identified new customers, developed relationships with existing customers, ordered and delivered products, stocked and replenished products in customers’ locations, and otherwise promoted sales and customer service. Plaintiffs purchased bakery goods from defendants and sold them to the customers at a profit, which they kept.  They increased profits by increasing business. The goods came from outside Connecticut and were transported by the workers to their final destinations in Connecticut, using their own vehicles.

Plaintiffs claimed they were transportation workers, transporting bakery products on the intrastate leg of interstate commerce. In contrast, the bakery companies focused on the business aspect of the work, to say that plaintiffs are not transportation workers because their primary activities are in the bakery industry, not the transportation industry. They are more akin to sales workers or managers responsible for all aspects of a bakery products distribution business. Thus, they argue, the Section 1 exception is no impediment to the application of the full Federal Arbitration Act.

The Connecticut district court agreed with the defendant bakeries, ordering the workers to arbitration. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether these distributors of bakery products are in the bakery industry or the transportation industry. And that determination will decide whether their employment claims will be resolved in court or in arbitration.

Does Admiralty Law Permit Punitive Damages in a Seaman’s Injury Claim Based on Unseaworthiness?

The Lane Law Letter

The Supreme Court rules that it does not, in Dutra Group v. Batterton, decided on June 24, 2019.

“This case asks whether a mariner may recover punitive damages on a claim that he was injured as a result of the unseaworthy condition of the vessel.” With that introduction, Justice Alito began a fascinating history of maritime personal injury claims on behalf of merchant seamen. In maritime and admiralty cases, the federal courts sitting as courts of admiralty “proceed in the manner of a common law court,” as instructed by the Constitution. In Batterton, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to decide that punitive damages are not available in a mariner’s personal injury claim based upon unseaworthiness of the vessel.

Christopher Batterton worked as a deckhand on vessels owned by Dutra Group. His hand was injured when it was caught between a bulkhead and a hatch that blew off as a result of unventilated air accumulating and pressurizing with the compartment.

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On This Date in SCOTUS History – June 13

The Lane Law Letter
photo by Jennifer Enberg

​In 1966, the landmark case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was decided.  The 5-4 majority held that a person in custody must be informed of his right to counsel before and during questioning, and the right to not self-incriminate.  It further held that the suspect must not only understand these rights but, should the suspect choose to waive these rights, that it be done voluntarily.  While most are familiar with the case of Miranda v. Arizona, which gave rise to the term “Miranda rights,” did you know that three additional cases fell under this SCOTUS ruling?  Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart, had been consolidated with Miranda.


In 1967, Thurgood Marshall was nominated to the Court by President Johnson. He was confirmed on August 30, 1967, by a vote of 69-11, becoming the first African American to serve as an Associate Justice.  Justice Marshall, himself, won 29 out of the 32 cases he argued before the Supreme Court, the most famous being Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Supreme Court Resolves Maritime Product Duty-to-Warn Issue

John C. Lane

The United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Maritime Law, a unique and large body of federal common law, tempered by any controlling Congressional enactments. So, in recently decided Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, the Court addressed the scope of the duty of a marine product manufacturer to warn of a potential harm from a part that is required to be incorporated into its product. Here, the part to be added contained asbestos, and it allegedly led to the deaths of two Navy sailors. Their families sued the manufacturer of pumps, blowers, and turbines, but not the manufacturer of the asbestos-containing added part that actually caused the harm. The Supreme Court sided with the families.

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